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1. Introduction
The technique termed "Fragmented Data Processing" (FDP) [Fray and Fabre 1989],
[Deswarte, Blain et al. 1991], [Trouessin, Fabre et al. 1991] is a new approach to the combined
provision of overall system security (in the sense of data and processing confidentiality) and
reliability in distributed systems. It can provide each of the users of a distributed system with an
individual set of processing and storage resources which are to a great extent protected not only
from the effects of hardware and software faults but also of so-called "intrusions". By this term
we mean (presumably) deliberate attempts by other (possibly unauthorized) users of the system
to gain information from, or modify, or deny access to, the user's resources. For example, such
attempts could even involve tampering physically with the hardware, or inserting "Trojan Horse"
software.
The FDP approach, and the original Fragmentation-Redundancy-Scattering (FRS)
scheme [Fray, Deswarte et al. 1986] on which it is based, are strongly related to conventional
fault tolerance techniques. FDP achieves high reliability/availability and security for critical
applications by arranging that their execution depends merely on (i) the correct execution of a
majority of a set of copies of each of a number of program fragments, and (ii) the reliable
storage of a majority of a set of copies of each of a number of data fragments; such fragments
are widely distributed across a number of computers in a distributed computing system so as to
impede intruders and to tolerate faults, and are defined so as to ensure that an isolated fragment
is not significant, due to the lack of information it would provide to a potential intruder.
2In effect, fragmentation and scattering is just a form of encryption, though one whose
overheads are quite modest, and whose use fits well with general fault tolerance provisions
(replication and voting) that are aimed at providing high reliability and availability despite the
presence of hardware and software faults. Indeed, the crucial point about FDP is that the
services it provides depend not on the integrity of any individual software or hardware
components (which would imply the existence of "single points of failure"), but rather on
majority voting by members of various sets of components. It simply presumes that such
majorities exist (thus assuming a limit on the number of simultaneous faults) and in particular
that voting is not being invalidated by either accidental or deliberate collusion between voters.
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Figure 1: A User View of the System
More specifically, systems employing FDP are, from the point of view of each user,
divided into two sets of resources, namely a "trusted" (and it is hoped trustworthy) set and an
"untrusted" set, as illustrated in Figure 1, which along with Figure 2 comes from [Fray and
Fabre 1989]; users can designate particular applications running on the "untrusted" set of
resources, as being ones which are to be protected (using FDP and the "trusted" resources)
against the effects of accidental and intentional hardware and software faults. This protection
involves the use of the trusted hardware and software resources, whose own integrity (including
freedom from intrusions) is thus relied upon by the FDP mechanisms. The trusted resources,
with the user and his/her means of accessing these resources, constitute a "Trusted Area". (The
issue of what precautions are needed for these resources to be worthy of the given user's trust,
and hence such reliance, are dependent upon the risks posed by the environment. This issue is
not addressed here - however the topic of 'trusted area reduction' is returned to briefly in Section
8.)
Typically, as in Figure 1, the untrusted resources form a shared set of processing and
storage servers, which users access from their individually trusted personal workstations, and it
is in these terms that the technique will be described here. Figure 2 shows how an application
launched by a user in one Trusted Area will in fact be fragmented and replicated so as to use
computers in a number of separate, and perhaps individually guarded, areas. The problems of
ensuring the security and reliability of the network that interconnects these areas will not be
3considered here, though FDP-like approaches, such as in [Koga, Fukushima et al. 1982] for
meshed networks interconnection, as well as more conventional solutions, to these problems are
quite feasible.
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Figure 2: Computers Involved in an Application
To date, the FRS and FDP schemes have been described, and implemented, using
conventional system structuring techniques. The principal purpose of this paper is to discuss
how FDP can be used in, and can benefit from, an object-oriented model of system structuring.
In particular, a first aim is to see whether the model can be used to (re)interpret the classification
of fragmentation and scattering mechanisms described by [Fray and Fabre 1989]. The paper
then goes on to speculate on possible new ways of using fragmentation and scattering, and to
discuss implementation issues briefly. Finally, a brief attempt is made to discuss object-based
security in more general terms.
2. Object-Based Structuring
The model used here is one in which we assume, at least initially, that at two (or more)
levels of abstraction we have a distributed complete interpreter. However, in practice, the upper
level is more likely to be just an interpreter extension (in the sense of the term as defined by
[Anderson and Lee 1981]) - discussion of the ramifications of this point is deferred mainly to
Section 2.1 below; and the possibility of there being more than two levels will be disregarded
from now on.
Each of the two levels is viewed as supporting a set of objects. In general within each
level (and certainly at the upper level) these objects will form a hierarchy, in fact a directed
acyclic graph, (based on the "is-part-of" relation), with objects being composed in part of
smaller objects, down to some set of elementary objects. Each object will belong to a class (or
type) whose declaration defines the operations (or "methods") available for using objects
belonging to that class, these operations providing the only means by which objects can interact
directly. (The declaration also defines any other operations, available for internal use, and any
internal variables (i.e. objects), by means of which such objects are implemented.)
The example in Figure 3 below, which uses C++ syntax, shows the class declaration for
objects whose external interface consists of just two operations (Method1 and Method2), and
4which are each composed of three smaller objects, each of class SubObject. There is one
operation declared for private use inside NewObjects, and two special operations (NewObject
and ~NewObject) which are implicitly invoked, respectively, when a NewObject is created or
destroyed.
class NewObject {
SubObject InternalObject1;
SubObject InternalObject2;
SubObject InternalObject3;
// private:
InternalOp();
public:
NewObject();   // constructor
~NewObject();   // destructor
Method1();
Method2();
}
Figure 3: A Class Declaration
It is assumed that such class declarations can, when appropriate, inherit definitions from
one (or, when multiple inheritance is permitted, more) parent classes. By such means the
characteristics, both functional and "non-functional", of the objects of a given class can be
declared to possess a modified, typically augmented, set of characteristics, based on those that
the parent class defines (or inherits). Class declarations can be thought of as providing
information which is used at compile time, for example to provide each object with a reference
to, or when appropriate its own copy of, the code of its operations. Alternatively, as in Smalltalk,
class declarations can themselves be regarded, and may be implemented in the actual system, as
objects (of a special system-defined type called "class"), each containing the code that is used by
all the objects of a given class .
On the other hand, the relationship between the object hierarchy at the upper system level
and the hierarchy that exist at the lower level could be quite distant, especially if the upper level
is a complete interpreter (e.g. for Smalltalk, but written in C++). Even with a partial interpreter
one might have quite complex inter-relationships, for example having objects such as segments
provided by an operating system at the upper level, and pages provided by the hardware at the
lower level, using an intricate scheme whereby small segments were packed into pages, and large
segments split across pages.
With such a two-level system model, various different dependability-related
characteristics could:
5(i) be defined in the upper (application) level of abstraction, and associated with particular
classes of objects, via the class declarations of their operations, and then could when so
desired be inherited or redefined in further class declarations, and/or
(ii) be supplied by application-independent mechanisms in the underlying complete hardware
(and therefore probably not very object-oriented) or software interpreter.
Method (i) above is exactly what the Arjuna distributed programming system
[Shrivastava, Dixon et al. 1991], developed at Newcastle by a team led by Santosh Shrivastava,
uses to provide various reliability (but not as yet security) characteristics, such as recoverability,
atomicity and stability for distributed application programs in the face of possible processor
crashes. (Arjuna is based on C++ and UNIX, and provides its facilities completely by means of
C++ declarations, without introducing any changes into the language, its run time support
system, or the UNIX system.)
An example of the use of method (ii) in combination with method (i) would be the use of
replication of, and voting by, the processors which implement the Arjuna system, so augmenting
at the lower level (by masking arbitrary processor faults) the upper level fault tolerance facilities
provided via C++ declarations. This in fact is something that the Arjuna group is investigating
using multiple transputers[Ezhilchelvan and Shrivastava 1991].
2.1. Object-based Protection
The strength of any security provisions is limited by the extent to which potentially
dangerous actions can be intercepted, checked, and perhaps prevented, by some form of trusted
"reference monitor" [Ames, Gasser et al. 1983]. A complete interpreter, by its very nature, can
incorporate facilities for monitoring every action that occurs in the system that it is supporting.
In contrast, an interpreter extension can of course directly monitor only those actions which it
itself implements, and must otherwise rely (even for the protection of its own code and data) on
whatever monitoring functions are provided by or via the interpreter on which it is implemented.
Some implementations of object-based programs do much of their checking only at
compile time (C++ for instance) - and to this extent provide very limited built-in protection
against any hardware faults or software faults which occur (e.g. are surreptitiously introduced)
after compilation, perhaps just prior to execution. They thus suffer from a dangerously long
TOCTOU (Time of Check to Time of Use). This situation could however be remedied by
implementing the programs on some appropriate sort of capability-based computer architecture,
so in effect providing a strong guarantee of the validity at run time of the valuable compile-time
abstraction provided by the use of an object-based language.
3. Types of FDP
In the paper [Fray and Fabre 1989], which introduced the idea of FDP applied to
programs without considering object-oriented structuring, there is a discussion of types of
fragmentation, the classification being based on data granularity, four levels being identified: bit-
slices, basic variable types, structured variable types and modules/procedures. In effect, these
four levels of granularity encompass two rather different types of fragmentation. The two larger
6granularity schemes respect and use the structuring of the original program and its code; the
other two define and use an alternative to this original structuring.
Users are in general expected to indicate what data and/or code is "confidential", the level
of fragmentation to be applied, and which resulting fragments are to be "scattered" to computers
in different security areas. These fragments will in general involve one or more data items and its
corresponding code segment, and will either be specified explicitly or perhaps with the aid of a
preprocessor.
3.1. Classification of FDP techniques
The more detailed, and somewhat different, classification of fragmentation and scattering
techniques given by [Trouessin, Fabre et al. 1991], is summarized in the four classes below, in
each case first giving the original term for a class, and then the term used in this paper. The
techniques are used to produce scattered fragments at different granularity levels:
(i) Vertical, or Bit-slice fragmentation (B-FDP): The bit-slicing technique is applied to
basic data items without regard to the way in which they are formed into larger data
structures or used by the program. This technique does not try to make the program code
secure - it just requires the necessary multiple variants of the program needed to deal with
the set of different data slices. This approach is very convenient for arithmetic operations
on confidential integer values for instance: the definition of elementary fragments in this
way can be seen as a data-driven approach.
(ii) Horizontal, or Structured fragmentation (S-FDP): This technique treats program and
related data structures together, in producing sets of fragments for replication and
scattering. Each fragment consists of one of the programmer-defined code modules (this
can be recursively performed on sub-modules within modules) and its local data on an
instruction-by-instruction (or block-by-block) basis, with the global data being shared
(transmitted) somehow between such fragments. Thus though this technique makes the
overall program obscure to an intruder, it does not really attempt to hide what each
individual program module does, or what data it does it to. This approach is very
convenient for basic building blocks within elementary programs: the definition of
elementary fragments in this way can be seen, a priori, as a code-driven approach.
(iii) Transverse, or Parallel fragmentation (P-FDP): The idea here is to rely on the
analogy between "parallelism" and "fragmentation"; ideally, parallel versions of specific
algorithms are used to define fragments. Nevertheless, this approach can be seen as
derived from the above two techniques, and involves first applying bit-slice fragmentation
to the basic data items, and then further fragmenting the resulting program fragments
(code and data) horizontally using the programmer-defined module boundaries. (The
description given by [Trouessin, Fabre et al. 1991] implies the possibility of using a
succession of such bit-slice and structured-oriented fragmentations, essentially recursively,
so presumably each successive use of the bit-slice fragmentation involves using narrower
"slices". The notion of repeated use of structured-oriented fragmentation presumably
involves taking advantage of successively smaller program modules.) This approach
relates well to applications which are or could easily be written so as to make explicit use
7of parallelism and seems very convenient for matrix computations for instance; the
definition of elementary fragments in this way can be seen as both code- and data-driven .
(iv) Client-server, or Trusted fragmentation (T-FDP): The original term is confusing
since the basic execution model for FDP is the client-server model for all types of
fragmentation. The T-FDP approach is in fact orthogonal to the above fragmentation
techniques since it aimed at satisfying security objectives not only with respect to data
items but also to the main body of the application code, whatever the granularity of the
fragments. This approach can thus either be applied to elementary operations or to user-
defined programs. The approach relies on the "trusted/untrusted" division of the resource
space. This technique is described as an extension of either the structured or the parallel
fragmentation techniques - so it in fact provides two further classes of technique. Further
security is given to the program by arranging that in addition to having its code
fragmented and scattered it is also arranged that execution of the main program module is
performed by a trusted computer, with only subsidiary modules being spread amongst
other (untrusted) computers, and invoked using remote procedure calls from the main
module.
In the case of bit-slice fragmentation, sets of corresponding bits from the various data
items are held together, along with an appropriately modified version of the complete program.
The modifications are to arrange (i) that the right bits are worked on by a given process, and (ii)
that each process cooperates appropriately with the processes executing the programs (in other
computers) relating to neighbouring bit slices (i.e. those from adjacent bit positions).
In the other cases discussed in [Fray and Fabre 1989] and [Trouessin, Fabre et al.
1991], only the relevant parts of the program, augmented by the necessary code for ensuring
cooperation, are held with the set of data fragments allocated to a particular set of computers.
Thus performance (and program code security) is enhanced, though data security is diminished,
as one moves to higher levels of data granularity.
4. Object-Oriented FDP
The object-oriented model would appear to provide a reasonably straightforward method
of generalizing and implementing structured fragmentation (S-FDP) and its trusted variant (T-
FDP), simply by defining and providing an implementation of the appropriate class
characteristic, and then choosing which classes of object should inherit this characteristic. Thus
just as Arjuna allows all objects of a class to be declared as recoverable, so the objects of a given
class could be declared to be "Secured" by being fragmented and scattered. (One could
alternatively provide fragmentation and scattering on a per object rather than a per class basis -
this point will be returned to briefly in Section 8 below.)
For example, one might have either complexvector or vector (or indeed both) inherit the
characteristic "secured". These three possibilities are symbolized in Figure 4, in which the
various objects are labelled with numbers indicating the different (sets of) computers they have
been allocated to. These numbers have been chosen based on the simplistic rule that the number
of computers is minimized, subject to ensuring that the immediate sub-objects of any
fragmented object, and the object itself, are allocated to different (sets of) computers, depending
on which class(es) of objects have been defined to inherit the characteristic "Secured".
8Inheritance of the "secured" characteristic is denoted by "Secured → ObjectClass" in the
following figure.
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Figure 4: Different Inheritances of the Characteristic "Secured"
Considering implementation issues in slightly more detail, one possible implementation
of the characteristic "secured" would involve arranging that for each object of the class all the
immediately subsidiary objects are extracted from within the object, and then separately
replicated and scattered across the various computers. With the example shown in Figure 3
above, this could mean that InternalObject1, InternalObject2, and InternalObject3 were held on
computers separate both from each other and from those holding the object's operation
9definitions (see Figure 5). (This leaves open the question of which computer or computers are
used to execute any particular operation - the simplest possibility being the one(s) holding the
operation definitions.)
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Figure 5: Sub-Object Fragmentation/Redundancy/Scattering
Such a method of fragmentation and scattering would leave the original object largely
empty, apart from the information necessary for accessing its now remote subsidiary objects,
and the code (or a reference to the code) for the various operations. (A more extreme form of
implementation of such a declaration might involve also somehow fragmenting the code
corresponding to the set of operations, perhaps to the extent that InternalOp, NewObject,
~NewObject, Method1 and Method2 were represented (and executed) on several different
computers.)
The actual means by which such forms of fragmentation and scattering can be achieved,
e.g. the methods for placing, and later accessing remote subsidiary objects, will depend on the
strategy that is being provided to users for handling distribution problems. For example, a user
who is programming the class "secured" might be provided with the simple, but rather inflexible,
facility of a single virtual name space (e.g. [Bal and Tanenbaum 1988]), whose implementation
embodies and hides the distribution policies which are in use. Another alternative is the facility
provided in SOS at INRIA [Makpangou, Gourhant et al. 1991; Shapiro, Gourhant et al. 1989]),
for allowing users to declare and implement shared distributed objects (termed "fragmented
objects" in SOS) out of elementary objects which are located on different computers. (Clearly,
with such an approach the distribution policies remain under user program control.) However in
either case, a trusted means will be needed for identifying the set of fragments - normally some
sort of "key"; methods for providing and, most importantly, protecting such keys are discussed
in Section 7.4.
Fragmentation decisions might be largely static, based on information in the program or
generated by the compiler, or might be highly dynamic. The latter would necessarily be the case
if one wished to fragment and scatter the elements of a dynamic array of objects - and could be
defined in a special class "scattered array", so that a single definition of fragmentation and
scattering could be used for arrays of different classes of objects, provided class-based object
structuring [Meyer 1987] and multiple inheritance are supported. The allocation of objects to
computers involved in fragmentation and scattering could in principle also be, in some cases at
least, partly static - dynamic allocation, however, would allow one to make better use of a set of
operational computers whose membership changes as computers fail and are repaired, and also
to attempt to obtain performance improvements via load balancing.
10
In summary, the advantages of object-based methods of controlling fragmentation and
scattering are that:
(i) they avoid the complications of global variables,
(ii) they readily support repeated fragmentation and scattering, that is of objects within objects,
(iii) fragmentation and scattering can be applied selectively, at least on a per class basis, and
different object classes can use different methods of performing it,
(iv) a standard implementation scheme can be provided as a built-in class declaration, but this
can be overwritten under programmer-control, so as to provide a scheme more attuned to a
particular class or classes of objects.
(v) being in terms of the structuring already introduced by the programmer, their performance
(including their ability to exploit the existence of multiple processors) will benefit from the
fact that this structuring (presumably) reflects patterns of access and interaction, and so
provides good locality of reference. (Alternatively, it perhaps could be argued that a
fragmentation and scattering technique which cuts across programmer-defined structuring
would be more effective in obscuring the semantics of the program from intruders than
one which respects such structuring; this issue is pursued further in Section 5 below.)
However such schemes do not directly address one of the techniques discussed in [Fray
and Fabre 1989], namely the use of programmer-supplied application-specific "constraints" -
these being, in effect, a method of specifying particular objects which it is desired to prevent an
individual intruder from correlating, and which must therefore be allocated to different
computers. In fact, it appears that the task of re-organizing a program so as to meet such a
fragmentation and scattering specification would be very application-specific; it seems to have a
lot in common with the (in general difficult) task of detecting potential parallelism in a sequential
program and transforming the program (either by hand or automatically) so as to make use of
this parallelism.
The basic FDP techniques are of course also related to parallelism issues, though in this
case the parallelism which is already may be more or less explicit in the program structure, and
hence much more easily identified and exploited. Indeed, there already exist a number of
techniques (under various different names) which are somewhat akin to fragmentation and
scattering, aimed at exploiting parallelism for performance purposes rather than at providing
security. These include, at the hardware level, so-called "disk striping" and, in object-based
programming, the object fragmentation provisions of the SOS system that were referred to
earlier.
5. Multi-Level FDP
It can be seen that the (two-level) object-based model described in Section 2 above also
provides a way of discussing, and generalizing bit-slice fragmentation, and hence the related
aspects of B-FDP fragmentation and its T-FDP variant (as discussed in Section 3). This
involves viewing them as techniques which are carried out by the underlying interpreter, at
whatever granularity is required, from bits to pages.
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Bit-slice fragmentation, as originally envisaged, presumes that the required sets of
modified programs needed to accompany the data fragments, and to cooperate with each other
so as to perform the task of the overall application, can be generated readily, though not
automatically, from the original program. However, at least in principle, one could instead
provide bit-slice fragmentation simply by implementing the underlying interpreter in a truly
object-based language, and employing in it exactly equivalent mechanisms to those we described
in Section 4. In other words, one would arrange that those interpreter object types used to
contain representations of the code and data of upper-level objects would be constructed from
appropriate sub-objects and would inherit the characteristic "secured". (This would obviate any
need to modify application programs.) Moreover it makes it clear that the difference between bit-
slice (B-FDP) and structured (S-FDP) fragmentation is merely a matter of the level of
abstraction at which one is viewing the overall system - and that parallel fragmentation (P-FDP)
just involves their joint utilization.
The lower-level (B-FDP) fragmentation and scattering could be implemented and used
without explicitly considering the fact that the upper-level interpreter might also be performing
fragmentation and scattering (i.e. S-FDP), in much the same way that a conventional paging
system might be unaware of dynamic storage allocation of arrays being performed by the
program that is being paged. Alternatively, the interpreter could be specially designed to respect
the object structuring defined at the application-level. That is, it might for example deal
separately with the information relating to individual upper-level objects (provided that it has
knowledge of their boundaries).
In principle, therefore, the provision of sophisticated combined schemes performing
what is in effect a generalization of parallel fragmentation (P-FDP), is quite straightforward,
though their engineering would need careful consideration. In fact it would appear that the
problems of having co-existing application level and interpreter-level fragmentation and
scattering, and of arranging that their combination achieves the desired overall effect without
excessive performance penalty, are probably analogous to those relating to multi-level
recoverability. An analysis of the latter issues is to be found in [Anderson and Lee 1979] and
[Anderson and Lee 1981]. (The potential problems, particularly those concerning performance,
also resonate faintly with those of recursive virtual machines [Lauer and Wyeth 1976].)
6. Different Views of Object-Oriented FDP
Starting from an object-oriented design of a secure application, the implementation using
FDP can be considered from at least two different viewpoints:
The designer's view (see Figure 6) consists in defining (i) the various class hierarchies,
(ii) identifying the classes of objects which contain/process "confidential" information, (iii)
among such classes of objects those that must be executed on the "trusted" resources and those
that can take advantage of FDP solutions and therefore be executed on "untrusted" resources.
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Figure 6: Designer view of FDP
The hierarchy presented in Figure 6 shows one top-level object decomposed into several
sub-objects at different abstraction levels and identifies the objects which contain "confidential"
information (black boxes) from others that do not have to process sensitive information (white
boxes). All the leaves of this hierarchy are "elementary" objects whose processing is supported
by the object-oriented runtime and the underlying operating system. This non-balanced tree
actually defines different interpreter (some complete, some just interpreter extension) layers of
elementary objects.
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Figure 7: Engineering view - Interpreter layers for "secured" objects
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The engineering view of the FDP execution ( Figure 7) consists in deciding which type
of fragmentation has to be used in order to satisfy the security objectives with respect to
sensitive objects (black boxes), and also the associated replication strategy
The object-oriented runtime support and the appropriate class definitions provide various
FDP solutions - represented here by fragments within circles. The figure re-emphasizes the
points made in Section 5 above by showing the possibility of providing what the application
programmer will view as S-FDP by defining various appropriate classes, or B-FDP by the
underlying run-time system. If both S-FDP and B-FDP are provided simultaneously then one
will have what the user will view as P-FDP.
In each case non-sensitive objects (white boxes) are not fragmented, and can be executed
as a whole either on "trusted" or "untrusted" resources, taking into account that input-output, at
least, operations have to be performed in the "trusted" area. The engineering view of the FDP
execution, consists finally in setting up the configuration of the application objects on
distributed resources. FDP solutions provided by the lower interpreter layer are transparent to
the user and will have been implemented and installed previously. For T-FDP the execution of
the corresponding fragments must take into account the user-defined partition
"trusted"/"untrusted", since some of the fragments may be required to be executed in the
"trusted" area of the current user. (T-FDP is not represented in Figure 7 since it may be used
for the implementation of any FDP solution.)
7. An Example
Our example is in fact based on part of the specification of the user authorization service
[Blain and Deswarte 1990] [Deswarte, Blain et al. 1991] provided in the DELTA-4 distributed
system [Powell, Bonn et al. 1988]. (For the purposes of this example it is assumed that the
service merely (i) controls the forms of access rights that already-authenticated users can have
wrt a hierarchically organized shared (in fact transparently distributed) archive system, and (ii)
enables system administrators to modify these access rights.) The service is provided by an
(abstract) single "authorization server". In fact this abstract server is implemented as a
distributed set of local servers, each of which is located at a separate security site, where it is
managed by a local administrator.
Our example, like the actual DELTA-4 authorization server, is designed to provide
confidentiality and freedom from denial of service (wrt archive access control) in the face of
possible hardware faults affecting the local authorization servers, and intrusions into the security
sites, including accidental or deliberate faults committed by the security administrators. In line
with the actual provisions of the DELTA-4 authorization server, two "grades" of confidentiality
are provided, one based on protecting the access rights information, and another yet higher grade
of confidentiality for the "keys" that this first level of protection depends upon. (These keys are
in fact used in DELTA-4 not just for the fragmentation operation on the archives and for naming
fragments [Fray, Deswarte et al. 1986], but also for controlling access to other servers - see
Figure 8, which is taken from a DELTA-4 presentation.)
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Figure 8: Authorization and Archive servers in DELTA-4
The actual DELTA-4 authorization service was not originally designed or implemented
using an explicit object-oriented style. Here, however, we present a small series of  classes,
which enable us to describe (a simplified version of) the original service. ( A new design of the
DELTA-4 authorization service using a pure object oriented style and making full use of
inheritance is beyond of the scope of this paper.) These classes only address the definition of
the management operations of archive descriptor directories which are performed by an abstract
directory server implemented by a local directory server on each security site. (In the DELTA-4
implementation, archive descriptor directories are replicated on security sites but not
fragmented.) For the moment, we omit from our example any mention of the mechanisms
involved in providing or using FDP, deferring such matters until Section 7.2.
The information used for the management of archives is stored in each of a set of archive
descriptors and can be summarized as follows:
•identification: archive name;
•fixed access list: access rights similar to UNIX permissions (r,w,x) and 
categories (owner, group and others);
•dynamic access list: list of entries related to one specific user or group of users and 
the corresponding permissions.
These descriptors are the leaves of a tree (a subtree) of the Archive Directory Server.
Any user in the system can create several archives and thus hold several descriptors; descriptor
information is stored within files in his "personal archives directory": /archives/fred/document.a
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is the archive descriptor of the archived document belonging to user fred. A user is also able to
store the archive descriptors hierarchically, and thus have several "archive working directories":
/archives/fred/nuclear/document.a is the descriptor of an archived document, presumably of
nuclear information, and thus in the sub-directory nuclear.
One interesting aspect of this example is that it shows that using the FDP approach, the
confidentiality of information such as the relation between directories and descriptors (i.e.
subjects and documents) or the relation between descriptors and access rights (i.e. who is able to
access what) can be preserved even with respect to administrators of security sites.
In order to make the presentation more clear, access-right management at the directory
level will not be considered in detail here; only access-rights within archive descriptors are
covered. Nevertheless, the object-oriented access-rights management scheme which is defined in
the next section could be used at the directory level.
7.1. Object-Oriented Management
This section presents an object-oriented approach to the management of Directory and
Descriptor information; the basic rights checking operations are also taken into account. Some
of the object classes (and their component objects) forming the Archive Directory Server object
are shown in Figure 9, where an asterisk indicates the possibility of there being several
components of a given object class.
ARCHIVE DIRECTORY 
SERVER
ENTRY*
DESCRIPTOR *
FIXED
PERMISSION
RIGHTS*
*
DYNAMIC
PERMISSION
RIGHTS*
*
(reference DES)
DIRECTORY*
FIXED
PERMISSION
RIGHTS*
*
DYNAMIC
PERMISSION
RIGHTS*
*
(reference DIR)
Figure 9: The object composition hierarchy
The object hierarchy represented in Figure 9 for the archive directory service is as
follows (the abbreviated names used in the figure are given below in bold caps):
ArchiveDirectoryServer: Implements the operations of the archive directory service; it is
partially composed of a set of AuthorizationDirectories (DIRECTORY), the whole
organized as a tree, and a set of Descriptors which are in effect the leaves of this tree;
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The set of available operations on this object are: Create, Destroy, VerifyRights,
NewRights, ModifyRights.
AuthorizationDirectory: Implements the operations which manage directories; it is composed
of set of references (ENTRY) to AuthorizationDirectories and ArchiveDescriptors and a
set of access rights related to the AuthorizationDirectory; these are represented in one
FixedAccessRights list (FIXED) and one DynamicAccessRights list (DYNAMIC);
The set of available operations on this object are: Create, Destroy, AddEntry,
RemoveEntry, SetEntry, SearchEntry, SetRights, UnsetRights, AddRights,
CheckRights.
ReferenceEntry: Implements the operations which manage references (ENTRY) to directories
or to descriptors but also to search a given reference;
The set of available operations on this object are: Create, Destroy, SetEntry,
SearchEntry.
ArchiveDescriptor: Implements the operations performed on the information related to a given
archive. It is composed of a set of access rights represented in one FixedAccessRights list
(FIXED) and one DynamicAccessRights list (DYNAMIC).
The set of available operations on this object are: Create, Destroy, SetRights,
UnsetRights, AddRights, CheckRights.
FixedAccessRights: Implements the operations on access rights similar to Unix rights for
owner, group and other users (like the chmod Unix command); it is composed of three
Rights objects (RIGHTS) OwnerRights, GroupRights and OtherRights;
The set of available operations on this object are: Create, Destroy, SetRights,
UnsetRights, CheckRights.
DynamicAccessRights: Implements an access control list (ACL) to particular users or groups
of users not mentioned in the FixedAccessRights and the corresponding operations; it is
composed of a list of Rights objects (RIGHTS) associated to users or groups;
The set of available operations on this object are: Create, Destroy, AddRights,
CheckRights.
ElementaryAccessRights: Implements the access rights of a given owner, a given group or a
given user but also access rights for other users, identified by a Name and is composed of
a restricted set of two Permissions objects (PERMISSION), one for Read access and one
for Write access (but could also include other permissions for Append, Delete...);
The set of available operations on this object are: Create, Destroy, SetName,
CheckName.
ElementaryPermission: Implements a very elementary object, one permission (Read or
Write), which is in fact a flag saying if the permission has been set or not; it could be
represented on one bit!
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The set of available operations on this object are: Create, Destroy, Setflag, Unsetflag,
Checkflag.
Note the above makes no mention of inheritance, and hence of whether a public method's
implementation is given in the class definition of the particular object, or is inherited from some
other class definition.
In order to illustrate the usage of such object classes, we briefly present few steps of
some management operations on one example (rights checking is not presented here) in which
the creation of one directory object and one descriptor object is detailed:
Directory creation:
• A new directory, say fred's nuclear directory, is created by invoking the Directory
constructor: Directory (nuclear).
• This operation also creates a new entry in fred's "personal archives directory", using the
AddEntry method with type DIR: AddEntry (nuclear, DIR).
• A new entry structure using the Entry constructor and set the name nuclear using the
SetEntry method: SetEntry (nuclear, DIR).
• The Fixed and Dynamic constructors are then invoked to create the Fixed and the
Dynamic access right list; appropriate rights and permissions are also created.
Descriptor creation:
• A new descriptor, say document.a, can be inserted in a given directory (reference), say
nuclear, using the method AddEntry: AddEntry (document.a, DES).
• The AddEntry method invokes the SetEntry method to assign the EntryName: SetEntry
(document.a, DES).
• The Descriptor constructor is invoked to create the descriptor document.a:
Descriptor(document.a, fred, staff).
• The Fixed and Dynamic constructors are invoked to create the Fixed and the Dynamic
access right lists; appropriate rights and permissions are also created.
This hierarchy of constructors and methods initializes the DirectoryName (nuclear),
ArchiveName (document.a), the OwnerName (fred) and the GroupName (staff). In a real
implementation, a descriptor should hold several other objects such as a semaphore and the size
of the archive, which are omitted in this simplified example.
The Fixed constructor invokes the Rights constructor three times to create the
OwnerRights, GroupRights and OtherRights objects. The Rights constructor invokes
Permission to create the ReadPermission and WritePermission objects. The Permission
constructor does not set any flags; a flag can be set using the SetFlag public method on the two
permission objects ReadPermission and WritePermission.
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Finally, the Dynamic constructor is invoked to create and initialize the dynamic access
control list using the Rights and Permission constructors. The dynamic access right list is
constructed and initialized to empty; new rights can be granted to named users using the
AddRights method: AddRights (user, brian, read) using SetFlag(), for instance.
The above actions are used to create a new descriptor document.a in a new directory
nuclear referenced in the /archives/fred personal directory. Figure 10 shows the object hierarchy
created for the document.a descriptor; this descriptor is associated with a descriptor entry of
type DES in fred's nuclear directory:
FixedACL
GroupRightsOwnerRights
Read
(1)
Write
(1)
Read Write
(0) (0)
OtherRights
Read Write
(0) (0)
(other, *)
DynamicACL
Read Write
(1) (0)
(user, brian)
UserRights
(document.a)
Descriptor
(owner, fred) (group, staff)
Figure 10: The Resulting DescriptorEntry object
The italic labels with the descriptor objects shown give example values of private
variables at each abstract level:
• document.a is set by the Descriptor constructor;
• fred is set by the SetName method of the Rights object;
• 1 is set by the SetFlag method of the Permission object.
Rights checking is performed using CheckRights, CheckName and CheckFlag methods,
but is not detailed in this section.
7.2. Object-Oriented Fragmented Processing
In this section we give some examples of the effects that can be achieved by arranging
that the characteristic "secured" be inherited by various object classes:
(i) a directory, say fred's "personal archive directory": /archives/fred;
(ii) a descriptor, say document.a;
(iii) both a fixed and a dynamic access control list, say FixedACL and DynamicACL;
The effects of using such inheritance are discussed using the above three examples. For
clarity in our examples we attach the characteristic "secured" directly to a chosen class or classes
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to demonstrate what effect this will have. (In an object-oriented design of the DELTA-4
authorization server that used inheritance amongst its class definitions, one could arrange that
the "secured" characteristic was inheritable from higher in the class hierarchy.)
In each of our examples, site number 1 represents the security site where the security
administrator is able to execute management operations and where all the archive descriptor
directories are located when FDP is not used. (The implementation of the class "secured" and its
effects on objects that inherit this characteristic are discussed in Section 7.3.)
7.2.1. "Secured" directories
In this case the characteristic "secured" is attached to the /archives/fred directory. This
solution leads to processing (and perhaps storing) FixedACL, DynamicACL and Entry objects
at distinct sites whatever the type of the Entry: DIR or DES. (The fragmentation and scattering
of the FixedACL and the DynamicACL objects is discussed in Section 7.2.2.)
Considering just Entry objects, all the directory entries that appear in the /archives/fred
directory (personal, nuclear, financial...) will be managed (and perhaps stored) at different
sites. All the descriptors entries at this level could also be managed (and perhaps stored) onto
different sites, but we do not consider this case at first; we suppose that all the entries at this first
level are directories as shown in Figure 111:
Secured → DIRECTORY
nuclearpersonal financial
fred
1
2 3 4
Figure 11: "Secured" directory entries
One possible implementation would thus be to manage and store all subdirectories at
different sites. With such a solution a persistent local directory server at each of sites 2, 3, and 4
is responsible for the management of fred's subdirectories. The Archive Directory Server at site
1 is responsible for the management of fred's personal archives directory. An intruder located at
site 2 is unable to find out about the various archive subdirectories belonging to user fred; the
confidentiality of the relation (fred's personal directory, subdirectories) is thus preserved by sites
2, 3 and 4.
We now consider the case of entries being descriptors, when, for instance, the
characteristic "secured" is attached to the /archives/fred/nuclear directory. (For simplicity in our
                                                
1 Figure 11 is in fact a simple representation of a hierarchy of directories. All the Entry objects in
figure 11 are references to DIRECTORY objects named by their corresponding DirectoryName.
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example all its entries are of type DES.) This solution leads to processing (and perhaps storing)
descriptors at different sites (see Figure 122):
Secured → DIRECTORY
nuclearpersonal financial
fred
1
1 11
documentA.a documentB.a documentC.a
2 3 4
Figure 12: "Secured" descriptor entries
With such a solution, a persistent descriptor server responsible for descriptors
management has to be defined by the class Descriptor, and installed at sites 2, 3 and 4. The fact
that archive descriptors belong to a given directory (a given subject, in fact) is hidden from
intruders at these sites; the confidentiality of the relation (subject, archives) is thus preserved.
(Note that if the characteristic "secured" was also attached to /archives/fred then all the objects
in Figure 12 would be located at different sites.)
7.2.2. "Secured" descriptors
In this case the characteristic "secured" is attached to descriptor objects, document.a for
instance. This solution leads to the fragmentation and scattering of sub-objects FixedACL,
KeyFragment and DynamicACL to different sites; Rights methods for OwnerRights,
GroupRights and OtherRights objects are executed at the same site, as shown in Figure 13.
In this case an intruder located at site 2 is not able to know who are the users referenced
in the DynamicACL. With such object fragmentation and scattering, the confidentiality of the
relation (FixedACL, DynamicACL) is also hidden from an intruder; for instance, it is not
possible at site 2 to find that, despite no permissions having been given to fred's group (staff),
brian is nevertheless granted read permission for document.a.
                                                
2 Figure 12 is also a simple representation of a hierarchy of directories and descriptors; the leaves of
this tree are Entry objects which are references to DESCRIPTOR objects stamped by their corresponding
document name.
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Secured → DESCRIPTOR
FixedACL
GroupRightsOwnerRights
Read
(1)
Write
(1)
Read Write
(0) (0)
OtherRights
Read Write
(0) (0)
(other, *)
DynamicACL
Read Write
(1) (0)
(user, brian)
UserRights
(document.a)
Descriptor
(owner, fred) (group, staff)
1
2 3
Figure 13: "Secured" descriptors
One possible implementation of descriptors derived from this solution would be to
manage and store, for instance, the FixedACL objects of any of fred's document at a given site,
say 2.
7.2.3. "Secured" ACL
In this case the characteristic "secured" is attached to the access control list FixedACL,
document.a for instance. This solution leads to fragmented and scattered Rights objects
belonging to the FixedACL object being placed at different sites as shown in Figure 14:
Secured → FIXED
3 4 5 1
FixedACL
GroupRightsOwnerRights
Read
(1)
Write
(1)
Read Write
(0) (0)
OtherRights
Read Write
(0) (0)
(other, *)
DynamicACL
Read Write
(1) (0)
(user, brian)
UserRights
(document.a)
Descriptor
(owner, fred) (group, staff)
1
2 1
Figure 14: "Secured" FixedACL
Fragmentation and scattering could also be applied to the Rights objects, but these are
very simple so this use would in most circumstances be rather unrealistic, but nevertheless is
illustrative of what can be achieved. This could imply that, for instance, OwnerRights for
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document.a and any other Rights object that appears in the FixedACL are all held at site 5, say.
However another possible implementation of Rights objects could be such that the
OwnerRights, GroupRights and OtherRights objects related to a given user's documents are
processed and stored at different sites.
7.2.4. "Secured" ACL and Descriptors
For example, the characteristic "secured" could be attached to the access control lists
FixedACL (of document.a for instance) but also inherited by the descriptor object as in Figure
15. This solution leads to two phenomena:
1) Rights objects in the FixedACL are fragmented and scattered onto different sites (see
Section 7.2.3);
2) Use of the characteristic "secured" at the descriptor level, leads to the FixedACL and
DynamicACL objects being fragmented and scattered in the same way as in Figure 13
(see Section 7.2.2).
Secured → DESCRIPTOR, FIXED
4 5 6 3
FixedACL
GroupRightsOwnerRights
Read
(1)
Write
(1)
Read Write
(0) (0)
OtherRights
Read Write
(0) (0)
(other, *)
DynamicACL
Read Write
(1) (0)
(user, brian)
UserRights
(document.a)
Descriptor
(owner, fred) (group, staff)
1
2 3
Figure 15: "Secured" ACL with inheritance
In contrast to the situation shown in Figure 15, another possibility would be to attach the
characteristic "secured" to both the FixedACL and the Dynamic ACL object classes. This
solution provides a complete fragmentation and scattering of Rights objects whether they belong
to the Fixed or Dynamic ACL. The latter would provide to an intruder a partial view on the
descriptor object, similar to the notion of views used in multilevel security in object-oriented
database systems [Lunt 1989].
The result of this last solution leads to the definition of one possible implementation of
Descriptors:
1) OwnerRights for all of fred's archives are stored at one site where the management of all
of fred's document ownership can take place - presumably a workstation that fred trusts;
the GroupRights and OtherRights for all fred's archives could also be managed this way.
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2) UserRights in the DynamicACL could also be managed in this way and thus brian's
UserRights wrt fred's document.a would be managed on a workstation trusted by brian.
Finally, we would like to recall that using fragmentation and scattering at the directory
level may lead to user directories being organized in terms of users or at the level of subjects.
Thus using all the fragmentation and scattering strategies presented in Section 7.2 leads to all
information managed by the directory server being distributed among several sites according to
whatever confidentiality requirements are given.
7.3. Implementing the "Secured" characteristics
What we have termed "attaching" the characteristic "secured" to a given class means
arranging for this class to inherit a set of facilities defined in an appropriate class declaration.
These characteristics will, for example (i) ensure that when object of this given class are created,
their constituent sub-objects will be scattered, and (ii) provide each object with any necessary
information, such as a "key", needed to control the fragmentation and scattering and the means
by which the object's operations access its scattered sub-objects, and operations such as SetKey
and GetKey. These operations may well be defined in, and inherited by the class declaration
from, a class "key".
Some such keys might be used only at compile and generation time, and then
deliberately discarded (i.e. for what can be termed "static" fragmentation and scattering). Others
are likely to be retained within, or associated with, objects at run time (e.g. for "dynamic"
fragmentation and scattering, in which sub-object names are computed when the sub-objects are
invoked). Key objects might of course also be used for other purposes by other classes, as is the
case in DELTA-4, where keys are also used in the implementation of the archive server.
However the characteristic "secured" should involve not just fragmenting an object when
it is generated, into its sub-objects, but also replication as well as the scattering of the resulting
fragments. Object-oriented replication techniques have not been considered in this paper since
this topic has already been investigated by others, in the Arjuna project for instance. According
to the example given in the previous section and the discussion in Section 7.2.3, replication of
the Rights sub-objects needs definition of an appropriate set of workstations in fred's trusted
area to store, for instance, replicates of Rights objects.
In Arjuna the replication characteristic is implemented using inheritance with a
ReplicationBase class. A replicated object is declared as:
class ReplicatedObject: ReplicationBase;
The class ReplicatedObject inherits the replication methods from ReplicationBase class.
An instance of a replicated object in five copies is declared as:
class ReplicatedObject(5)
where the number of copies 5 is passed to ReplicationBase.
The "secured" characteristic could be declared in the same way, using the class
SecurityBase:
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class SecuredObject: SecurityBase;
Thus, using the above declarations Fragmention-Replication-Scattering is implemented
at the object level by multiple inheritance of the classes SecurityBase and ReplicationBase.
Different ways of implementing the stub generator of the SR-bases (where SR stands
for Scattering or Replication) classes may be defined:
(i) First, a generic stub generator for any class of object would need to be able to determine
the class of objects that is to be fragmented and scattered and/or replicated, and thus
conduct the appropriate operation with respect to the object type including multiple
initiations, handling multiple return values (and voting operations), etc.
(ii) A second solution would be to have one SR-base class per object class. The appropriate
SR-operation to generate a given object instance would be performed by the associated
stub generator; using inheritance and SR-operator overloading, the appropriate stub
generator is invoked for each "secured" object (sub-object).
Finally, different replication and/or fragmentation and scattering strategies can also be
implemented and selected from amongst the schemes which have been described in earlier
sections.
7.4. "Guarding the Guards"
Clearly, the techniques we have described so far depend on making sure that an intruder
cannot easily reconstruct an object that has been fragmented and scattered. If a key (e.g. that
expresses the relationships between its fragments) is needed to access a fragmented and
scattered object then the security of this key of course becomes critical. Such keys could be kept
and used only in appropriate trusted areas, or one could instead apply a further level of
fragmentation and scattering to them. However, such a potentially indefinite recursion must
eventually be broken either by the use of trusted areas, or by avoiding the use of keys.
This latter is the approach taken in the actual DELTA-4 system, which uses the notion of
a threshold scheme [Shamir 1979] to make the management of the keys it uses for its scheme of
FDP intrusion-tolerant (and, as mentioned earlier, also for other purposes). Such a scheme
represents the value of an object which is to be kept secret by a set of N shadows s1, s2, s3...
(Thus the replicates of a given object would contain different shadows of the object's key, the
key itself not being needed once the shadows had been created.)
This technique, which is appropriate only for relatively small objects, has the following
properties:
(i) a number of shadows greater or equal to the threshold T is required to create the secret
information,
(ii) less shadows than the threshold T do not give any information about the secret.
Implementing an object by means of a threshold scheme thus can ensure the continued
availability of the object, despite the occurrence of less that N-T faults, N being the number of
shadows generated, as well as confidentiality. This scheme is therefore analogous to the use of
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both fragmentation/scattering and replication. Thus in an object-oriented system it could be
provided, for inheritance by chosen object classes, via a class declaration which constituted an
alternative to the pair of classes SecurityBase and ReplicationBase discussed in Section 7.3
above, and which could itself use a class "key" implementing the shadowing scheme.
7.5. Commentary on the Example
The example presented in Section 7 reflects the use of an object-oriented design as a
basis for implementing a variety of fragmentation-redundancy-scattering techniques. The
example shows that different grades of confidentiality can be obtained using appropriately
chosen fragmented and scattered objects. The aim of our example was not to provide a new
implementation of the Archive Directory Server. Nevertheless, it gives the flavour of several
different strategies for ensuring the confidentiality and reliability of directories, archive
descriptors and access rights; for instance, directories may be stored by directory objects on a
user-by-user basis locally on one given site, access rights may be stored on a document-by-
document basis with only the associated owner rights, group rights or other rights. More
importantly, the actual implementation differences between these strategies are quite minor, since
they only involve differing decisions regarding inheritance.
Our example has however only explicitly demonstrated what we have termed S-FDP
techniques. However, one can readily imagine some such system as we have been discussing
being extended so as to form a complete interpreter for some language (say of authorization).
With respect to programs written in this language, the fragmentation and scattering techniques
we have described would be classed as B-FDP. And if fragmentation and scattering was also
provided within a new language the two mechanisms together would constitute P-FDP. Finally,
the use of T-FDP on a given application would involve arranging to hold the main body of the
application on the user's trusted workstation.
8. Other Forms of Object-Oriented Security
The principal, and in retrospect obvious, point made in this paper is that, with the use of
appropriate class declarations, security (together with reliability and availability) could be
provided as an inheritable characteristic in an object-oriented system - an idea that has recently
also been explored in the database community. (Though we have concentrated on its provision
on a per class basis, as being most transparent to application programmers, one could
alternatively provide it on a per object basis; this would of course require that the user indicate,
when requesting creation of an object, whether or not it is to be fragmented and scattered.) In the
above we have concentrated on one particular means (FDP) of implementing one particular form
of security (data confidentiality and integrity) together with facilities for hardware and software
reliability. It is interesting to explore what other methods of implementation, and other forms, of
security could beneficially be allied with object-oriented structuring
One very simple implementation of the inheritable characteristic "secure" could be
merely that of ensuring that the data items stored in such objects are normally held in encrypted
form. This would provide a modest but in some cases useful degree of security (in the limited
sense of confidentiality) even within a single computer system, and even against intruders who
managed to by-pass whatever storage protection mechanisms were provided - as long as they
cannot obtain the decryption key, or manage to access the data at any times when it is in
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unencrypted form. It thus would provide little protection against a serious attacker, but in certain
circumstances could have merit.
Regarding the FDP implementation, an underlying capability-based computer
architecture would almost certainly have to be used to enforce the object structuring if one
wished to admit the possibility of the user workstations suffering intrusions, or the software in
them not being entirely trusted, yet nevertheless still wished to rely on them to control the use of
FDP (and, for example, contain fragmentation keys). However, in such circumstances, the use of
a capability architecture, though necessary, would almost certainly be insufficient. Rather, one
would also need (i) any security-critical software to be thoroughly validated, since the capability
mechanism checks only the legality of programs, not their correctness, and (ii) administrative or
mechanical means of physically protecting the workstation, to ensure that what is being executed
is what was validated. In effect, this is going down the difficult and lengthy road of developing a
general purpose operating system security kernel, whether entirely in software, or (perhaps
preferably) based on a powerful hardware-based reference monitor [Sami Saydjari, Beckman et
al. 1987; Sami Saydjari, Beckman et al. 1989]). However, if this were feasible and if the
resulting kernel were deployed throughout the distributed system, there would be little need for
FDP, at least with regard to the provision of confidentiality, though the problems of denial of
service, and indeed of reliability in general would remain.
An alternative strategy, again avoiding having to trust the workstations, would be to
interpose Trusted Network Interface Units (TNIUs) between the workstations and their means
of communicating with the rest of the system, as is done in the Distributed Secure System
(DSS) [Rushby and Randell 1983] [Barnes and MacDonald 1986] [Bates 1991]. These TNIUs
could then be used to control FDP, rather than (as in DSS) to provide conventional encryption.
This seems quite feasible, as such TNIUs would still be comparatively simple, though they
would presumably require physical protection. (In terms of the obviously valuable goal of
'Trusted Area Reduction', the individual TNIUs are much 'smaller' than a typical workstation, but
the set of TNIUs are likely to be spread over a considerable geographical area, outside the
control of an individual user.)
Turning to issues of security policy, the FDP technique concerns the provision of just a
simple policy, namely separation and the prevention of denial of service. However, as with the
basic DSS concept, such separation provides a good foundation on which one could construct
more sophisticated mandatory (e.g. multi-level) and/or discretionary security policies (as in fact
have already been explored in the object-oriented database arena, e.g. [Fernandez, Gudes et al.
1989; Lunt 1989; Lunt 1990]). In the case of DSS further security policies have been
implemented either within the TNIUs, or by means of specialized servers, but in either case
involve trusted code. With FDP it could either be within the workstations (with all the security
concerns that this implies) or in specialized servers (which could themselves make use of FDP,
but nevertheless their code would have to be trustworthy). However, for both FDP and DSS the
trustworthiness of the code could be based either on fault prevention techniques, such as
validation, or fault masking techniques based on the use of design diversity.
9. Concluding Remarks
The Object-Oriented Fragmented Data Processing approach that we have described
generalizes the technique of FDP, as previously described and implemented. The multi-level
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view of system structuring which we have used shows how fragmentation-scattering can be
implemented independently by each of a hierarchy of interpreters, thus providing protection at
various granularity levels. Moreover we have shown how this approach provides a unifying
framework for various apparently rather distinct FDP techniques, herein termed S-FDP
(Structured FDP), B-FDP (Bit-sliced FDP) and P-FDP (Parallel FDP).
We would therefore argue that FDP, perhaps in common with certain other approaches
to security, so far explored mainly in the database world, can derive significant benefits from
being viewed and used in conjunction with a suitable object-oriented structuring scheme. Indeed,
its provision as an independently inheritable characteristic alongside the use of several forms of
inheritable reliability characteristics (such as "stable" and "atomic") that have already been
devised elsewhere, such as in the Arjuna Project, seems perfectly feasible. However, one
particularly attractive feature of the FDP technique is that it would seem to have the potential of
being simultaneously beneficial not just to security and reliability but also, because of its
exploitation of parallelism, to performance - characteristics which are normally mutually
antagonistic!
Detailed experimental investigations are however now needed to substantiate the hopes
expressed in this paper, and to determine the likely actual cost/effectiveness of object-oriented
FDP, as compared to the FDP that has already been implemented in DELTA-4, and any other
approaches to the joint provision of reliability and security.
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APPENDIX
The various classes given below are presented in a C++ like formalism, but they are not
completely defined and implementation details have not been investigated in detail. Nevertheless,
some additional comments are necessary:
1) Most of the variable instances are defined statically (e.g. using fixed size arrays of pointers);
implementation details on the use of files or more sophisticated data structures representing lists
of elements are not of interest in this example.
2) DIR and DES are pre-defined constants for a directory entry type and a descriptor entry type,
respectively (cf. Class Directory and Entry).
3) "owner", "group", "other" and "user" are pre-defined constants for the owner rights, group
rights, other rights and user rights, respectively(cf. Class Fixed, Dynamic and Rights)
4) "read" or "write" are pre-defined constants for read and write pennissions, respectively (cf.
Class Rights and Pennission).
4) "ok" or "null" are pre-defined constants for setting (unsetting) pennissions (cf. Class
Pennission).
6) The C++ functions presented in Table 1 and given in appendix A are member functions; a
member function F belonging to the object 0 is invoked O.F, providing the object oriented
flavour of C++. Such functions always receive an implicit argument which identifies the object
performing the functions.
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Class SERVER definition:
Class Server {
Directory*  DirectorySet [1000];
Descriptor* DescriptorSet [1000];
public:
Server (char*); // constructor
// (directory name)
~Server (char*); // destructor
void VerifyRights (char*, int, char*, int, int);
// (reference, owner/group/other, name, read, write)
void NewRights (char*, int, int, char*, int, int);
// (reference, type, owner/group/other, name, read, write)
void ModifyRights (char*, int, char*, int, int);
// (reference, owner/group/other, name, read, write)
// Only few methods have been defined for this class and thus the list is
// not exhaustive; several other appropriate methods should be added here.
}
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Class DIRECTORY definition:
class Directory {
char DirectoryName [20];
Entry* EntryTable [100] // table of 100 entries
Fixed; FixedACL; // Fixed Access Control List
Dynamic DynamicACL;
public:
Directory (char*); // constructor
// (directory name)
~Directory (char*); // destructor
void AddEntry (char*,int); // create a new entry in a directory
// (entry name, type of entry DIR or DES)
void RemoveEntry ();
}
Class ENTRY definition:
Class  Entry {
char EntryName[20]; // reference name
int EntryType; // type of entry DIR or DES
public:
Entry () ; // constructor
~Entry (); // destructor
void SetEntry (char*,int); // Initializes Entry structure
// (entry name, type of entry)
void SearchEntry (char*, int) ;
// (entry name, type of entry)
}
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Class DESCRIPTOR definition
class Descriptor {
char ArchiveName [20];
Fixed FixedACL; // Fixed Access Control List
Dynamic DynamicACL;
public:
Descriptor (char*, char*, char*); // constructor
// (entry name, owner name, group name)
~Descriptor (); // destructor
}
Class FIXED definition:
class Fixed {
Rights (owner) RightsOwner; // define OwnerRights object
Rights (group) RightsGroup; // define GroupRights object
Rights (other) RightsOther; // define OtherRights object
public:
Fixed () ; // constructor
~Fixed () ; // destructor
void SetRights (int, int);
// (owner/group/other, read/write)
void UnsetRights (int, int);
void CheckRights(int, int);
}
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Class RIGHTS definition
class Rights {
int Type; // type reference for owner, group, other, user
char Name [ 20] ; // owner name, group name or user name
Permission PermissionRead; // Read object
Permission PermissionWrite; // Write object
Rights (int); // constructor
~Rights (); // destructor
void SetName (char*); // set Name as owner, group or user
// (owner name, group name, * or user name)
void CheckName (char*); // check if it is owner, group or user
// (owner name, group name, * or user name)
}
Class PERMISSION definition
class Permission {
int Flag;
public:
Permission (); // constructor
~Permission (); // destructor
SetFlag (int) ;
// ("ok" or "null" value)
UnSetFlag () ;
CheckFlag () ;
}
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Class DYNAMIC definition
class Dynamic {
Rights* RightsTable [50]; // list of users or groups
public:
Dynamic (); // constructor
~Dynamic (); // destructor
void AddRights (int, char*, int); // creates new Rights
// (type user or group, user name or group name, read or write)
void CheckRights (int, char*, int); // check user or group rights
// (type user or group, user name or group name, read or write)
}
Class KEY definition
class key {
int Key; // Fragmentation key
public:
key (); // constructor
~key (); // destructor
void SetKey(int);
// (key value K of the fragmentation key)
void GetKey (int);
}
